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DIGITAL FORENSICS AND
CREDENTIALING
Nima Zahadat
University of Baltimore (UB), Universities at Shady Grove (USG)
nzahadat@ubalt.edu

ABSTRACT
Despite the phenomenal growth in the digital world and crimes committed using digital
techniques and tools, there are literally no foundational requirements to perform digital
forensic investigations. While there are several private and mostly for-profit organizations
that “sell” training and certifications regarding digital forensics credentials, at the federal
and state level in the United States, there seem to be nothing of the kind.
Keywords: Digital forensics, certification(s), computer forensics, digital evidence, quality
assurance, licensing requirements, credentials, private investigator (PI), Computer Forensics
Innocence Project

1.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the wide variety of areas in the medical field and that of the legal field, both requiring credentialing and accreditation at the
state and at times the national level, there
are no such requirements for digital forensic
investigators. It is fair to state that a person
caught practicing medicine without a state
license or a degree from an accredited institution, would be sued and even prosecuted.
It is also fair to state that most people would
not trust a doctor or a lawyer who was not a
graduate of a properly accredited university
with proper credentials from a state or federal government. Even becoming a private
investigator (PI) usually requires licensing in
most states.
Digital forensic investigation is one of the
prominent fields emerging from the broad discipline of forensic science. Though the academic theory and practice of digital forensics
has existed since the 1970s, increased interc 2019 ADFSL

est in the field has been witnessed recently
owing to escalated risks of cyber-attacks and
computer-related crimes (Altheide & Carvey,
2011). The field of digital forensics is particularly concerned with the evidence found in
computers, mobile devices, storage devices,
social media and cloud services among other
IT related elements that can be used in trials
and other forms of inquiries (Mohay, 2005).
Data extraction, collation, carving, and the
release of forensic expert reports are what
encompasses the core of practice in the field.
While there are no national standards for
digital forensic credentialing, and for that
matter, no state-level ones, some states have
attempted to bring about such standards.
As will be seen, these efforts have been halfhearted and somewhat disorganized, many
times causing more problems on the legal
realm than offering solutions. Many of these
states lump Private Investigator (PI) licensing and forensic credentialing into one in an
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attempt to add legitimacy to forensic investigators, which is quite a peculiar approach.
Below are some of the states and localities
that have attempted to bring about some
consistency to forensics investigations and a
brief overview of their attempts and methodologies:
Alabama: Alabama offers no forensic licensing credentials, but the city of Mobile requires
a city-issued private investigator (PI) license
to do forensic work (Leonardo, White, & Rea,
2012).
Colorado: Colorado is somewhat intriguing
as the state does not have any digital forensic requirement, and PI licensing is voluntary.
Because Colorado’s PI licensing is voluntary,
anyone can come to the state and be licensed
as a PI, even if they have broken the law elsewhere. According to the Colorado Legislature
itself, there have been numerous instances of
wrongdoing by licensed PIs from Colorado.
District of Columbia: Washington, DC
requires a PI investigator license for digital
forensic examiners (Leonardo, White, & Rea,
2012).
Georgia: Georgia has required that digital forensic examiners obtain PI licensing
(Leonardo, White, & Rea, 2012).
Indiana: Indiana, as of 2010, has elected
not to require any credentialing or licensing
for digital forensic examiners (SANS, 2010).
Maine: Maine, like Georgia, has mandated
that digital forensic examiners obtain PI licensing (Leonardo, White, & Rea, 2012).
Maryland: Maryland requires a PI license
for private investigations, but neither digital forensic licensing or credentialing is addressed.
North Carolina: Like Indiana, North Carolina has elected not to require licensing of
any kind for forensic investigators (SANS,
2010).
Oklahoma: Oklahoma is really odd as it
permits that a PI license from another state
can be used to get a temporary license in
Page 2
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Oklahoma. This means if an investigator
needs a temporary license in Oklahoma, they
can get one from Colorado first (InfoSec &
Forensic Law, 2013).
Texas: Texas has implemented the notion
that digital forensic examiners/investigators
license themselves as PIs in the state. Texas
has gone so far as to interpret digital investigation to include computer technicians and
repair personnel (Leonardo, White, & Rea,
2012).
Virginia: Virginia codified in 2011, explicitly stating that PI licensing requirements did
not apply to any certified forensic individual
employed as an expert witness. Virginia has
reciprocity agreements with several states,
including Georgia (Leonardo, White, & Rea,
2012).
It is worth pointing out that several states
including New York, Nevada, North and
South Carolina, Washington, and Virginia
are pushing to have PIs handle digital forensic investigations. No states were found to be
offering any paths towards an independent
digital forensic licensing and credentialing.
Despite being well established in recent
times, the discipline of digital forensics continues to face several core problems. A needs
analysis survey by Rogers & Seigfried (2004)
indicated training and certification as the
main challenges, a claim collaborated by several stakeholders in the field including the National Institute of Justice. There are concerns
that the field is largely fragmented, lacking
a national framework for curricula training
and development. Pollitt (2010) in his paper “A History of Digital Forensics” starts his
work by apologizing to his audience, admitting there is little reliable data and rigorous
logic that he can bring them regarding digital forensics. He gives a history of digital
forensics based on his 20+ years as a criminal investigator, then proceeds to make some
bold predictions, acknowledging he will probably be wrong in many of them. In addition,
c 2019 ADFSL
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the field as currently constituted has no gold
standard for certification, a central challenge
in instilling consistency and professionalism
in the field. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published special publication 800-181, a National Initiative
for Cybersecurity Education or NICE as a
reference structure describing the interdisciplinary nature of cybersecurity work. NICE
attempts to provide a common lexicon, foundational frameworks, workforce categories,
specialty areas, roles, knowledge descriptions,
skills descriptions, abilities descriptions and
a host of other well-thought-out guidelines,
complete with example systems. This special publication would serve as part of an
excellent starting point for digital forensics
framework development and digital forensics
academic development though, by itself, it
would not be sufficient as it is too broadly
focused on cybersecurity. It is designed as a
starting point to be applied in the public, private, and academic sectors but does not focus
entirely on forensic training, credentialing, or
accreditation. NICE framework is comprised
of the following components (NIST 800-181):
1. Categories – a high-level grouping of
common cybersecurity functions
2. Specialty Areas – distinct areas of cybersecurity work (includes digital forensic)
3. Work roles – detailed groupings of cybersecurity work comprised of specific
knowledge, skills, and abilities required
to perform tasks in a work role
While NICE can be one of the solid starting points, there is still the egregious issue
of credentialing and certification in digital
forensics, which this paper explores, drawing
from relevant academic literature.
It must be pointed out that various agencies such as NSA and DHS have developed
programs that institutions can apply for and
c 2019 ADFSL
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be designated as meeting the bar set by these
agencies. For example, NSA and DHS have
jointly developed the Centers of Academic
Excellence in Cyber Defense (CAE-CD) program. Regionally accredited colleges and universities can apply to this program and if
approved, have their curricula be designated
as such, receiving formal recognition from the
US government. This is certainly an appealing program for many universities, including the author’s university which has applied
for this exact program, but it is still a fragmented solution and a voluntary one, and
one that does not address digital forensics
credentialing and accreditation at a high level;
it focuses primarily on what the NSA and
DHS consider necessary security processes
and controls.

2. RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
The research was qualitative and descriptive
in nature, utilizing published research in the
field of digital forensic investigation. A search
was conducted in major academic databases
including Google Scholar and ProQuest, isolating articles from reputed journals on the
subject of the federal, state, private, profit
and non-profit credentialing of digital forensic
investigators in the United States. Additionally, private recommendations and practices
of private organizations such as ISC2 , Guidance Software, and AccessData were studied.
Each study was evaluated for the relevance
of content and timeliness, with the inclusion
criteria only featuring articles within roughly
15 years of publication.
A review of literature focused on the general fundamental theories in the domain, the
problematic issue of credentialing and possible solutions. Thematic reflections on the
findings on various issues were noted and forwarded as recommendations and conclusions
on the present state of the identified problem.
Page 3
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3.

LITERATURE
REVIEW

Though many studies in digital forensic investigations have identified the bias in available research towards applied aspects of the
domain as opposed to the development of
fundamental theories, prejudice is justified.
This is because of the largely practical nature of forensic science at large and the pressure mounting from external events such as
cyber-terrorism and cyber-crimes, necessitating more applied research (Nelson, Phillips
& Steuart, 2014). As it emerges, the issue of
credentialing of digital forensic investigators
at various levels falls under applied research
and continues the implied bias. However,
there is credence in the fact that several studies identify the lack of a proper credentialing
standard as one of the main challenges facing
the profession today. For instance, a study by
Flory (2015) indicated that though the state
of Indiana’s law enforcement agencies was deliberate about digital forensic training with
half of their staff trained, their ability could
only be rated from low to mid-range. As
such, there was still an overwhelming need to
create a standard and comprehensive framework for locating experts, obtain a forensic
insight with the help of standard operating
procedures, and finance career advancement
in the domain. The above study shows the
longstanding nature of the challenge of credentialing and locating competent experts in
digital forensics and thus justifies the focus of
research towards that direction (as opposed
to fundamental theories).
The issue of credentialing, though vast,
seems to be overshadowed by the looming
challenge of lack of a proper, consistent curriculum in the first place. As such, a good
deal of research is currently dedicated to advancing training and ensuring that there is
a teaching framework that can be followed
successfully by most universities and colleges.
Page 4
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As noted by Lang et al. (2014), the development of a digital forensics curriculum should
provide a self-contained and comprehensive
tool for teaching the discipline in universities
given the failure of many institutions to offer
such courses for missing certain aspects of
the entry barrier. In their proposed curricula,
Lang et al. (2014) offered an introductory
and an advanced course and hands-on laboratory programs. They, however, failed to focus
or mention at any point, the essence of credentialing and its role in developing the digital
forensics investigator. This seems to be consistent with most curricula and reports on the
status of digital forensics investigation and
related disciplines throughout. For instance,
a report by West Virginia University Forensic Science Initiative (2007) submitted to the
Department of Justice (DoJ) on training and
education of digital forensics investigators
highlights the antecedent qualifications and
a detailed career path but omits otherwise
essential information on credentialing. The
report is comprehensive on other aspects of
training and career path, highlighting the
qualifications, skills, and knowledge needed,
the Associate, Baccalaureate, and advanced
levels of learning in the discipline, but makes
a major omission on certifications and credentials needed in the profession. This sums
the whole credentialing challenge in available
studies- that most of it loom in the shadow
of a clear training and education framework
for digital forensic investigators.
The literature on building accreditation
and credentialing in digital forensics is quite
unappealing. This is primarily due to the
confusion surrounding digital forensics in the
first place. Losavio et al. (2016) make the
bold allegation that digital forensics is not
yet a profession and attempts justification
of the claim on several grounds. According
to the paper, a profession entails specialized
knowledge, specialized training, highly valuable work, self-regulation, a code of ethics,
c 2019 ADFSL
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high levels of autonomy, and many other significant elements. Certification and credentialing are what offer code of ethics, autonomy of practice, and evidence of specialized
training, but lack in the discipline as per the
arguments of Losavio et al. (2016). This has
hindered the development of digital forensics
as a profession. A large number of studies
indeed recommend that proper standardized
frameworks are brought into the frame for
credentialing of digital forensic investigators.
Butler (2015) highlights some of these recommendations offered by the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS). They include creating a
standardized accreditation model for digital
forensic investigators to achieve recognition,
consistency, and the “expert” label.
From the reading, it appears that there is
a robust framework for providing oversight to
various accreditation bodies in digital forensics. These include the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), the
Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC)
which came together to carry out research
and chart a framework that can operationalize accreditation bodies. The national commission on forensic science on its part acts
as an advisory body to the DoJ and carries out various roles that form the framework for accreditation. These include advice
on training on science and law, testimony
and reporting, provision of interim solutions,
and above all, accreditation and proficiency
testing (Garfinkel et al., 2009). Therefore,
though there are no consistent accreditation
frameworks, the framework to regulate bodies that offer credentialing exists and operates
with a clear mandate.
The development of accreditation oversight
in digital forensics has since been reported at
the national level. Coordinated by the DoJ
and with the advice of NIST, such frameworks have emerged as a product of OSAC’s
efforts. According to Butler (2017), OSAC
c 2019 ADFSL
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has been involved in the development and
promulgation of technically-appropriate and
universally accepted documentary standards
that are used by accrediting bodies to audit
forensic laboratories and carry out credentialing of forensic investigators. OSAC has
since developed to include a Forensic Science
Standards Board and various committees and
subcommittees that are responsible for offering oversight in the approval process for
forensic sciences standards as provided by
various scientific area committees.
There are several credentialing bodies,
many of which are international that are apparent in the field of digital forensics. Gladyshev, Marrington, & Baggili (2014) note that
the bulk of these organizations are either
for profit or privately owned, with the government only providing the business operational framework that such bodies can use
in carrying out certification and accreditation. They include companies like Mile2 and
ISC2 . Other entities include the EC-Council,
the American Board of Information Security
and Computer Forensics (ABISCF), International Association of Computer Investigative
Specialists (IACS) and International Society
of Forensic Computer Examiners (ISFCE)
(Freiling & Schwittay, 2007). Some of these
bodies, in particular, ISC2 , use the standards
and frameworks issued by bodies like NIST to
offer certifications such as Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP),
Certified Authorization Professional (CAP),
and Certified Cyber Forensics Professional
(CCFP). For instance, the CAP certification,
which includes Digital Forensics Incident Handling, Risk Management, Continuous Monitoring, Auditing, and Assessment, is based
almost entirely on the NIST guidelines, in
particular the 800 series and more specifically, 800-86 (Guide to Integrating Forensic
Techniques into Incident Response), 800-37
(Risk Management Framework), 800-30 (Risk
Management Guide), 800-39 (Managing InPage 5
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formation Security Risks), 800-53 (Security
Controls), 800-53A (Security Control Assessments), and 800-137 (Continuous Monitoring)
among others. Other organizations such as
EC-Council have had certifications for years
in the field and continue to add more and
revise already existing ones to make them
more attractive to government agencies and
private organizations. These certifications
are updated every 3-5 years with more material added, some outdated material removed,
and most are touted as skills that government
and industry look for in today’s forensic and
security professionals. The fact that there
are so many private organizations offering so
many certifications, many in digital forensics,
is testament to the need for having a credentialing and accreditation process as well as a
testament to how private organizations are
utilizing this opportunity to advance their
own goals, primarily financial, even if they
are labeled as non-profit.

4.

CASE STUDIES

The National Academy of Sciences stresses
the importance of quality assurance procedures in the practice of forensic science to
“identify mistakes, scientific fraud, examiner
bias, and to confirm the continued validity
and reliability of forensic processes and to
improve on processes that need to be improved” (Jordaan, 2012). In digital forensics
specifically, a comprehensive quality assurance/quality management plan is required
to ensure the credibility of digital forensic
laboratories. Quality assurance in the digital
forensics process is also seen as a critical issue in the practice of forensic science by both
the National Research Council in Washington, DC and the Association of Chief Police
Officers in London. As the public have seen
in recent years, failure to implement quality
assurance procedures in digital forensics can
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lead to innocent persons being convicted of
crimes (Jordaan, 2012).
One particular case which resulted in a
wrongful conviction was that of Connecticut
school teacher Julie Amero (Jordaan, 2012).
According to Alva & Endicott-Popovsky
(2012), the case of State of Connecticut v.
Julie Amero provides an understanding of
how a general lack of knowledge of digital
forensic evidence can lead to the wrongful
conviction of an innocent person. In 2004,
Connecticut substitute teacher Julie Amero
was monitoring a seventh-grade classroom.
Having had to step out into the hallway for
a moment, upon her return, Amero found
two students browsing a website about hair
styling (Alva & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012).
Soon after that, the web browser began opening pop-up advertisements depicting pornographic images. Amero did not turn off the
computer, as she was instructed not to and
was unaware that the monitor itself could
be turned off. Several of the students in the
classroom were exposed to the pornographic
content. During Amero’s trial, the primary
evidence presented by the state was the forensic copy of the hard drive of the computer in
question. Though the digital forensic investigator, in this case, did not utilize industry
standards to make a copy of the hard drive,
the evidence was still admitted into court
by the judge. The prosecution claimed that
digital evidence would show an Internet history of pornographic links, indicating that
Amero deliberately visited pornographic websites (Alva & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012).
Later during the ordeal, a computer forensics expert for the defense discovered that
the school’s antivirus software was not regularly updated nor maintained; also, no antispyware, firewall, or current content filtering tool was found on the school’s computer
(Alva & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012). The defense computer forensics expert was Herb
Horner, a self-employed computer consultant.
c 2019 ADFSL
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In his examination of the hard drive, imaged
installed on his computer without his knowlfrom the school’s computer, Horner found
edge by malicious actors, installing a Trojan
evidence that spyware had been installed
horse program to gain control of his computer
on the computer, thus causing pornographic
and launch the DDoS attack. A forensic expop-up images to continuously appear on the
amination of his computer by prosecution’s
monitor (Alva & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012). expert witness, Professor Neil Barrett, found
Despite the evidence found by Horner, the
tools that could be used to launch an atjudge, in this case, refused to allow the full
tack, but no trace that a Trojan horse had
testimony of defense expert witness, Herb
been planted, despite Caffrey’s claim (George,
Horner, into evidence, claiming that the in- 2003).
formation to be presented by Horner was
Nevertheless, Aaron Caffrey was acquitted
not made available during discovery prior of launching a distributed denial-of-service
to the trial proceedings (Alva & Endicott- (DDoS) attack in the United States, even
Popovsky, 2012). Ultimately, Amero was
though both prosecutorial and defense attorfound guilty of “Risk of Injury to a Child,” neys confirmed that Caffrey’s computer was
and at one point, faced the possible fate of
responsible for the DDoS attack (Brenner
a 50-year prison sentence. Fortunately, the
et al., 2004). It is assumed that Caffrey’s
State Court of Appeals reversed the decision
defense was able to convince the jury that
made by the lower court, and a motion for a Trojan horse armed with a “wiping tool”
a new trial was accepted. In an effort to was responsible for the attack, which resulted
put the events behind her, Amero eventually in the editing of the system’s log files and
pled guilty to a misdemeanor and agreed to
deletion of all trace of the Trojan; the proshave her teaching license terminated (Alva &
ecution claimed that no technology existed
Endicott-Popovsky, 2012). The events lead- that could perform such sophisticated tasks
ing up to and during Amero’s trial caused
but without success. Caffrey’s case is part
great emotional, social, and financial stress
of the phenomenon commonly known as the
on her and her family. Amero and her family “Trojan horse defense,” which became popular
have also experienced several health prob- in the UK during the early 2000s (Brenner
lems due to the stress caused by the events
et al., 2004).
leading up to and during her trial (Alva &
Endicott-Popovsky, 2012).
5. KEY FINDINGS
While the case detailed above shows that
digital forensics is not foolproof and can lead There were a number of findings from the
to the conviction of innocent persons, digi- research conducted on digital forensics investigation. First, it became apparent that cretal forensics handled poorly has also led to
dentialing was a major issue in digital forenguilty persons being acquitted in court. One
example of this is the case of Aaron Caf- sics and featured some of the main issues
that were on the radar of major stakeholders
frey. On September 20, 2011, less than two
weeks after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) such as the National Academy of Sciences
and NIST (Casey, 2009; 2011). It, thereterrorist attacks, Aaron Caffrey was charged
fore, qualified to extend the bias on applied
with “carryout of a denial of service attack on
the computers of the port of Houston, Texas” research over fundamental theorizing in the
(Brenner, Carrier and Henninger, 2004). Dur- general domain of forensic science. In ading trial proceedings, Caffrey claimed that dition, the field in the broader scope was
fragmented and lacking in proper curricula,
the evidence brought against him had been
c 2019 ADFSL
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which was the preoccupation of various stakeholders and educators, rather than the formation of credentialing frameworks (Nance,
Hay, & Bishop, 2009). As such, the issue of
credentialing while important, had been overshadowed by the lack of proper, standardized
curricula in the domain.
It was also apparent that the state and federal levels of governments were largely nonactors in the credentialing of digital forensic
investigators. According to Garfinkel (2010),
the majority of the bodies involved in accreditation and certification were private companies, including non-profit and for-profit organizations. They included Mile2, EC-Council,
and ISC2 among others, offering a number of
accreditations such as the Certified Computer
Examiner (CCE) to digital forensic experts.
The scarcity of literature on accreditation and
credentialing makes it difficult to determine
the repute and ratings of these organizations
(Lillard, 2010). However, they appeared to be
the main players in the credentialing in the
absence of state and federal governments actors. Instead, at least in part, the federal government offered guidelines which these bodies
used for their curricula and certification development, giving frameworks and standards
to be applied in the operationalization of the
credentialing bodies. These guidelines were
carried out by the DoJ, National Academy of
Sciences and other affiliates working closely
with the DoJ such as OSAC and NIST.
According to Lundquist (2016), there are
several instances where private digital forensics have failed in assisting DoJ investigations, leading to the incarceration of the innocent and mistrials in some cases. These
include the case of State of North Carolina
vs. Bradley Cooper and the previously mentioned case of State of Connecticut vs. Julie
Amero among others. In each of the highlighted cases, there were anomalies in the
process of collection, collation, submission,
and reporting of evidence. Oversight bodPage 8
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ies can improve this by coming up with a
standardized framework for digital forensics
that can be applied in all cases. This entails credentialing of experts that the court
can rely upon as experts in cases requiring
digital forensic evidence (Kessler, 2007). At
the moment, oversight appears fragmented
due to the lack of a singular, unifying, and
standardized curriculum to build on at the
national or even at the state level.

6.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the research presented, clearly,
more attention needs be paid to credentialing,
which entails research, funding, and advocacy
at the national and state levels. A national
framework for developing and teaching digital forensics in order to bring standardization to the field is a necessity. This needs
to be followed by a complementary credentialing system which would set the base for
professionalism in digital forensics investigation methodology, processes, and techniques.
Finally, state and federal governments must
assume active roles in the oversight and accreditation of credentialing bodies with measurable results.
Meyers and Rogers (2004) identify the following three areas where the computer forensics field needs improvement: the creation of
a flexible standard, qualification of expert witnesses and standards regarding the analysis,
preservation, and presentation of digital evidence. Any standard(s) developed for use in
the computer forensics discipline, must allow
for flexibility, so that the standard may adapt
to the continuous changes in technology and
the forensic process. It is also important that
computer forensic standards cover all aspects
of the forensic process; from the search and
seizure of digital evidence to the analysis and
examination of the evidence.
c 2019 ADFSL
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The second area identified by the authors
as needing improvement is the qualification of
expert witnesses. Because computer forensics
is still considered to be in its infancy, it does
not have any formal credentialing bodies, nor
a formal educational process. Therefore, in
adjudication processes, the courts accept persons as expert witnesses based on their skills
and previous professional work experience.
While this process has not been challenged
thus far, Meyers and Rogers (2004) anticipate
that in the future, expert witnesses’ qualifications will be more commonly challenged.
The final area identified by the authors as
needing improvement is standards regarding
the analysis, preservation, and presentation
of digital evidence. Meyers and Rogers (2004)
state that there should be “rigorous” standards and requirements along with continuous updates to the forensic process. Currently, the common method used to analyze
digital evidence relies mostly on the software
and/or hardware an expert uses in the analysis of the evidence; the authors challenge
that relying solely on the software/hardware
does not allow experts to fully understand
the digital forensics process so that they may
articulate the process to a judge in court
proceedings.
Finally, Meyers and Rogers (2004) stress
the importance of the implementation of a
universal system for certifying those who
claims to be computer forensic professionals, as a continuous lack of professional certification, investigative standards, and peer
review process may eventually result in computer forensics being labeled as “junk science”
instead of an accepted scientific discipline
(Meyers & Rogers, 2004).

JDFSL V14N1

7. POSSIBLE
OUTLINES FOR A
FRAMEWORK
The topic of presenting a potential full solution and/or framework for digital forensics
can arguably be a doctorate dissertation in
its own right. It is a large undertaking and
requires a great deal of research. One can
argue that even then it truly requires the
efforts of governments, law enforcement, and
academics to put forth a viable solution. Nevertheless, the following possible outlines are
intended to present the reader with some possibilities that are currently lacking in the field
and could serve as starting points.
Abdalla, Hazem, and Hashem (2007) offer
a guideline model for digital forensic investigation in their paper presented at the annual
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law (Abdalla, Hazem, Hashem,
2007). In it they first present several existing
models to include:
1. US Department of Justice’s Electronic
Crime Scene Investigation: A guide to
first responders
2. An Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Reith & Gunsch, 2002)
3. The Integrated Digital Investigation
Model consisting of 5 groups of 17 phases
total (Carrier & Spafford, 2003)
4. A Hierarchical, Objectives-Based Framework for the Digital Investigation Process (Beebe & Clarke, 2004)
The authors then proceed to offer their
own model which includes the following:
1. Preparation phase which includes prepreparation, case evaluation, preparation of detailed design for the case, and
determination of required resources.

c 2019 ADFSL

Page 9

JDFSL V14N1

2. Physical forensic and investigation phase
which has the goal of collecting, preserving, and analyzing the physical evidence
with an attempt to try and reconstruct
the crime scene.
3. Digital forensic phase which needs to
identify and collect electronic events that
may have occurred and proceed with
analyses.
4. Reporting and presentation phase which
needs to be based entirely on the policy and laws of each jurisdiction (e.g.,
state, county, country) and presents the
conclusions and corresponding evidence
from the investigation.
5. Closure phase which requires reviewing
the whole investigation process, determining whether the evidence found and
collected solve the case in a forensically
sound manner.
The model presented by Abdalla, Hazem,
and Hashem (2007), can be considered to be
universal, meaning that the authors try to
have a model that is applicable in every possible locality. The model does not address
issues when dealing with national security
and intelligence systems that require higher
sensitivity. Nevertheless, it, together with
NICE from NIST mentioned previously as
well as the other models mentioned can form
a solid starting point for the development of a
digital forensic investigation framework that
once formulated, should be sophisticated and
flexible enough to apply to a wide range of
localities and entities. Part of the framework
would need to discuss how to properly educate and credential would-be investigators.
At its heart, a digital forensic framework
must address the following areas:
1. Preparation phase
2. Acquisition phase
Page 10
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3. Analysis phase
4. Reporting phase
5. Legal phase
6. Education phase
7. Credentialing phase
8. Accreditation phase
This means that digital forensic investigators must be trained in these 8 main phases.
At the state and/or federal level, interested
investigators must be required to register and
take rigorous exams. These exams must address the phases of digital investigation and
evaluate would-be investigators understanding of the ideals and processes involved in doing digital investigations. These exams must
focus on assessing a test taker’s ability to understand the digital forensic processes with
the realization of its legal and ethical importance. The passing of these exams must be
made necessary to receive a state or federal license to practice digital forensic investigation.
This would form the backbone of the credentialing process of investigators. Given that
such frameworks would have to be turned
into curricula at the academic level in order to prepare interested applicants in digital
forensics, that, in turn, would bring about
the accreditation phase required for digital
forensics as all reputable universities teaching the field must be appropriately accredited.
Existing private sector certifications must be
made moot and removed as they generally
serve the financial interest of the organization
and not that of the general public.

8.

CONCLUSION

The present research brings to light obstinate
issues in the credentialing of digital forensic investigators. The status quo reveals a
troubling scenario of governments’ lack of full
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participation, lack of proper certification bodies, and oversight. This has, however, been
overshadowed by the apparent lack of a consistent curriculum at the national and state
levels to guide the teaching of digital forensics
at the university level and other institutions
of higher learning. The findings at a glance
show that there is a lot to do to instill professionalism and inspire further development of
digital forensics not only as a branch of forensic science but as an independent domain
emerging in contemporary scholarship. If the
recommendations issued are to be followed,
there shall not only be a solution at the academic level of digital forensics but also at the
professional level, which remains a cause for
concern. The governments should spearhead
curricular reinvention and development and
take their active roles in the promotion of
a unified credentialing framework to guide
other bodies in the same direction.
To be sure, federal agencies such as FBI,
Secret Service, IRS, and DoD have their
own certification and accreditation processes.
NIST also offers excellent certification and accreditation guidelines in its 800 series Special
Publications. External certification and accreditation processes supported and approved
by governments are desirable as they bring
consistency and professionalism to the profession of digital forensics. Programs developed
by DoD, NIST, DHS, etc. are certainly useful and at times quite necessary, but these
efforts are not coordinated and often target
the specific needs of the agency developing it.
Many times, they are too broad, attempting
to address too much. What is needed is a
collective and coordinated effort by the governments, and this cannot come soon enough.
The recent breaches of the federal Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) which leaked
over 22 million classified personnel records
and Equifax’s breach resulting in over 146
million private records of Americans being
stolen show the tremendous need for proper
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education, credentialing, and accreditation
of professionals in digital forensics investigations.
Finally, there will never be perfect solutions to digital forensics, and any attempt
at designing a framework with perfection in
mind would be futile. This is because it
is impossible to plan out every imaginable
scenario. The framework should create the
needed structure, academics would provide
the proper education and lab skills lumped
up as credentialing, and accrediting bodies
would provide oversight of the whole thing.
With that in place, there is still the professional outlook and behavior of the investigator, along with how much creativity he or she
brings to the job. Consider the simple case of
whether during an investigation, a computer
that is running should be left on while it is
being triaged or be turned off and taken to a
laboratory first.
There cannot be a single answer or a simple
answer to such situations. Part of the education and design has to be teaching would-be
investigators that each situation is unique
and while requiring proper and professional
steps to be taught and to be followed, cases
also need the proper application of judicial
prudence on the part of the examiner. Another situation that is a major issue is the
application of encryption to devices. It is still
the case that most devices are not encrypted
and can be analyzed without the worry of
dealing with encryption. That being the case,
investigators will come across devices that
may be encrypted and then would have to
make decisions as to what to do. For instance,
if coming across a Windows machine that
“might” be encrypted but is currently on and
running, a professional investigator should
have the skills to take a memory dump of
the running system since memory is never encrypted. Given the large memories of today’s
computers, a wealth of information may be
available just from the memory dump alone.
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Having properly dumped the memory, the investigator can then determine from the memory whether the computer is using encryption
at all and then make a proper assessment on
how to take the next steps. Skills such as
this are taught in proper accredited curricula
and also come by with some experience and
creativity. It should go without saying that
such skills are best taught and tried in the
academic and laboratories, in a structured
and controlled environment, instead of rogue
investigators botching up investigations while
they learn on the job!
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